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Abstract:
Purpose of the article: Organizations tend to apply Compliance Management System (CMS) as means to 
reduce risk. The fraud or corruption risk can be reduced by applying anti-corruption measures. The usefulness 
of these anti-corruption measures is not always questioned. Therefore measures might be applied which have 
little or no value in reality. Compliance Management Systems might be enhanced if hints can be found which 
measures are helpful for the organizations.
Methodology/methods: In a laboratory experiment possible cause-effect relations for anti-corruption 
measures were tested in an international setting. Populations from different countries were selected to test also 
differences in the national settings.
Scientific aim: The research aims at finding most effective anti corruption mechanisms and makes suggestions 
which kind of measures have a positive impact and which are negligible. This research presents the results of 
an experimental approach to further strengthen activity in the area of CMS. It highlights the use of CMS in 
order to conduct business through persons which are ethically sensitized.
Findings: The research highlights that not all applied measures do have a positive impact on decisions which 
have to be taken in ethical dilemma situations. Furthermore for single areas it became obvious that only 
specific measures do have an impact, general measures do not have an impact.
Conclusions: The effectiveness of CMS depends on a careful selection of the right activities. Nevertheless 
elements could be identified which are likely to have a stronger impact on the decision making than others. 
These should be in the focus when designing, evaluating and/or implementing a CMS. The approach should be 
embedded in an overall risk analysis to make sure that the relevant compliance risks are covered.
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1.  Introduction
The transferred Milton Friedman logic of “the busi-
ness of business is business” is no longer paramount. 
What Friedman defined as social responsibility 
was narrowly paraphrased as he argued the social 
responsibility of business is to increase its profits 
(Friedman, 1970). In the 21st century this perspecti-
ve has changed. It is assumed that business must be 
done in responsible ways. The social responsibili-
ty of business is therefore ethical business conduct 
with the purpose of profit maximization – which 
is not a contradiction. Compliance Management 
enhances the business conduct and supports accor-
dance with laws and regulations. Additionally a con-
stant increase in the request for transparency can be 
noted: “Around the world ethical expectations, if not 
behaviors, are leveling up.“ (Hamel, 2012, p. 5) The 
research elaborates on how business can be man-
aged sustainably by applying CMS. It is worthwhile 
to discuss the question if CMS matter or not. In an 
survey about ethics at work which was conducted in 
continental Europe with approx. 3.000 participants 
it was revealed that honesty is practiced by a majori-
ty of 77% in daily routines (Basran, 2012, p. 4). Ho-
wever 22% percent of the respondents felt pressured 
at work to compromise on ethical standards. This 
pressure might lead to unethical decisions which 
could have a negative impact for the company in the 
long run regarding for example fines and the image. 
A functioning CMS could possibly reduce this per-
centage. The reduction of the percentage would 
decrease the risk of image damages consequently. 
Corruption has been researched using principal-
-agent theory (Jacquemet, 2005). In his research 
studies, Jacquemet focuses on the delegation aspect 
which means that the agent has a conflicting interest 
when he is paid fairly by the principal. For this re-
search this effect can be neglected, because moneta-
ry incentives are not given to the participants.
Fadzil, Haron and Jantan also focus on principal-
-agent theory in their theory (Fadzil, Haron, Jantan, 
2005). The research question which leads the research 
work postulates that specific CMS activities enhance 
the conduct of business and have therefore a positive 
impact for the business. Palazzo et al. use another 
scheme to explain corruptive behavior. According 
to them corruption takes place in a morale vacuum 
which is called the ethical blind spot. This means that 
individuals who would not engage in illegal transac-
tions normally can commit crimes if the circumstan-
ces lead to a situation in which morale standards are 
not applied anymore. This ethical blindness is crea-
ted by proximal context in interaction with the sense 
making which is done by individuals and organizati-
ons (Palazzo, 2012, p. 324).
The object of this research is the study of certain 
CMS activities and their application to decrease 
corruptive behavior. The aim lies in an evaluation 
of the theoretically available means of a CMS re-
garding their pertinence, test possible combinations 
of activities and judge which activities do have an 
impact and should therefore be followed. Challen-
ges arise from the fact that the model was tested in a 
laboratory experiment. The generalization of results 
must be done with deliberate restrictions and general 
deductions for parts of the work should be done cau-
tiously. Constraints such as the practical handling of 
the test population entailed a laboratory experiment 
with a relative small sample group.
2.  Methodology
The question of the value add of CMS was tested in 
a laboratory experiment which was developed incor-
porating CMS activities which are applied in practi-
ce and could be applied theoretically. In order to test 
the theory of value add of specific anti-corruption 
measures a controlled environment is necessary to 
separate variables. The laboratory experiment was 
chosen as research method as the cause-effect relati-
onship can be studied with a high degree of control. 
Furthermore there is a chance to advance research 
in this particular field. Other researchers see expe-
riments as an important instrument in this regard as 
“(…) laboratory experiments could become one of 
the most effective tools to study corruption.” (Arma-
ntier, O., Boly, A., 2008, p. 21)
The experiment was not used to gain new data. 
It was used to test whether assumed cause-effect 
relationships are valid. In order to reduce general 
distortion to a minimum, the experiment was set 
in the context of a business game. The participants 
were told that they are about to participate in a bu-
siness game experiment, but they did not know the 
intention of the game. The business game represents 
a context which allows for empirical variables that 
can be tested.
The hypothesis underlying the experiment states 
that specific CMS activities enhance the conduct of 
business and have therefore a positive impact for the 
business.
In order to test the hypothesis the model under-
lying is based on the assumption that the return on 
Compliance depends on the effect applied Com-
pliance measures have on the decision making of 
individuals.
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The model was used to research the behavior 
in contexts where Compliance measures had been 
applied and in contexts where no Compliance mea-
sures were applied. As shown in Figure 1, the results 
of the decision making process were gained throu-
gh questions (possible answers include “Certainly”, 
“Almost certainly” etc.) with a treatment group and 
were compared with the results of the decision ma-
king progress by a control group who also partici-
pated in the experiment. If there is a difference be-
tween the two groups in the decision making process 
and the decisions reached it can be concluded that 
certain Compliance measures do have an impact. 
The theoretical conception implies that human be-
ings act better if they have been sensitized ethica-
lly. For the 5 variables items were used to test the 
underlying hypotheses. These items were deducted 
from a list of 30 elements for Compliance activities 
which had been clustered into three groups: Institu-
tional elements, strategic elements and operational 
elements. The items were tested in questionnaires 
which were given to the probands. As it is not po-
ssible to attract professional business managers for 
a laboratory experiment all at the same time, it was 
decided to conduct the experiment with students of 
management science. The set-up is therefore a simu-
lative environment of entrepreneurship. The expe-
riment with a simulation of a business environment 
is also a learning environment for future business 
manager. Therefore it can have an impact on their 
behavior as the intention of the whole procedure 
was also explained to the participants after the ex-
periment was finished. It must be noted that students 
of management in the future will be working as 
business managers and they might be put into bu-
siness dilemma situations which they faced in the 
experiment. The experiments can be judged as pre-
paration and sensitization for the real life scenarios 
which await them after university. The results can be 
generalized as the decisions taken in the role as bu-
siness development managers did not include a very 
specialized role. The experiment was set in a class 
of students attaining Bachelor and Master degrees 
at two universities. These are the University of La-
tvia in Riga and the University of Applied Sciences 
in Fulda. The profile description of the persons who 
participated in the experiment are classes of BSc and 
MSc students, both male and female, internationally 
mixed. The age is in the beginning 20s mainly. The 
logic of sampling required the choice of a sample of 
students to participate in the experiment. The samp-
le size was determined by scientific convention and 
group size of 29 students respectively 30 students 
for the first experiment and 29 and 40 students for 
the second experiment. In total 58 persons in the 
treatment group were tested with 70 persons in the 
control group. Two classes of students were separa-
ted into groups. In the first part of the experiment 59 
persons were tested. The treatment group consisted 
of 29 persons, the control group of 30 persons. In 
the second part of the experiment 69 persons were 
tested. The treatment group consisted of 29 persons 
and the control group of 40 persons. Overall the 
population for the laboratory test consisted of 128 
probands, whereas 58 had a treatment and 70 did not 
receive a treatment. The separation criteria for the 
laboratory experiment were a class with informati-
on on compliance management activities and a class 
Figure 1.  Theoretical conception of the decision model. Source: Own illustration.
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without information on compliance management 
activities. A group of individuals was separated into 
two subgroups at random. The behavior of the ex-
perimental group with treatment is compared with 
the control group without experimental treatment. A 
significant difference in the mean between these two 
groups leads to the conclusions of a causal influen-
ce of the independent variables in the experimental 
conditions.





 ● Reporting and
 ● Sanction.
The variables were used in questions which were 
presented to the probands. The answers were analy-
zed using SPSS software. The phenomenon compli-
ance is complex and characterized by many influ-
ences. Compliance in this context depicts measures 
against corruptive practices. A commonly accepted 
methodology to test theories has not been developed 
yet. Nevertheless it is the postulation from business 
that the applied measures have to be researched in 
terms of effectiveness: “More research on ways to 
measure effectiveness of instruments and practices 
to prevent, detect and investigate corruption is thus 
recommended. (…) it is difficult to draw clear-cut 
conclusions on the effectiveness of anti-corruption 
measures.” (PWC, 2013, p. 10)
The data gathered in experiment sessions shows 
the answering behavior of test persons and was used 
to test the hypotheses of different variables. These 
variables are used in the sub-hypotheses which sta-
ted that if specific compliance activities in regard 
to the variables were performed than the tendency 
towards corruptive behavior would decrease. The 
variables Information, Control, Instruction, Sanc-
tion and Reporting were tested in 4 items each. The 
variable Information was tested in 5 items. Additio-
nally the variables Information and Sanction were 
also introduced to the treatment group with general 
notes at the beginning of 3 different rounds. Totally, 
30 items were tested in specific scenarios requesting 
decisions from the participants. Furthermore du-
mmy items were introduced to distract from the real 
aim of the announced business game.
Table 1 shows the independent variables and the 
description for the experiment.
In total three questionnaires were handed out to 
the participants. The first questionnaire covers 24% 
percent of the variables (excluding the variable In-
struction), the second and third questionnaire each 
cover 38% of the variables. The reason for a smaller 
coverage in the first questionnaire results from the 
necessity to use the first questionnaire also to con-
vey general information and to make the participants 
familiar with the set up. Therefore a smaller popula-
tion of scenarios was chosen.
3.  Results
A non-paramateric test procedure was chosen as the 
ordinal scale and the not proven normal distribution 
did not allow for parametric test procedures. For the 
Mann-Whitney test the values of the treatment group 
and the control group which are compared are pla-
ced in one group. Following this each value is given a 
rank according to the position in the group. In the next 
step the sum of ranks is calculated for both groups 
separately. Based on the calculated sums the hypo-
thesis that both groups are the same is tested. The null 
hypothesis postulates that there is no difference be-
tween the two groups. If the null hypothesis is true the 
average values of the middle ranks of the two groups 
should be similar. This means that the value of the tre-
atment group and the control group in the rank order 
should be distributed approximately equally.
Table 1  Independent variables and their description for the experiment.
Independent variable Description for experiment
Information Short company description focusing on employees including core principles employees 
including core principles situations.
Controls Announcement of the internal audit function and by the application of 4 eye principle/ sign-off 
by superior.
Instruction Referrence to a work guidance or specific advice which is relevant for the employees.
Sanctions Cases of employee who violated company guidelines/law and mentioning of the fact that 
employees who breach the law are sanctioned (e.g. dismissal). 
Reporting Regular reports concerning misconduct and reports concerning the own work of employees.
Source: Own depiction.
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3.1  Group analytics
For the rejection of the null hypothesis the signifi-
cance level of 0,05 is chosen as scientific convention. 
A rejection of the null hypothesis on a significance 
level of 0,05 can be made for 9 items. These 9 items 
relate to 4 variables of the 5 variables tested. 2 out of 
the 4 variables showed a strong influence on the item. 
The results of the item analysis are presented as fo-
llows:
 ● Variable Information: Invitation to go skiing with 
competitor (0,009).
 ● Variable Control: Making a donation (0,004), Pa-
yment to „black listed“ external partner (0,000), 
Payment to supplier (0,004).
 ● Variable Instruction: Facilitation Payment 
(0,024), Mergers and Acquisitions (0,000), Video 
Beamer (0,010).
 ● Variable Reporting: Reading News (0,034), Do-
cumentation of invitations (0,017).
 ● Variable Sanction: For no item the null hypothesis 
could be rejected.
For all other items relating to the hypotheses the 
group means can not be judged as significantly dif-
ferent. Therefore the conclusions drawn can not be 
stated without a risk of mistake. The specific scena-
rios are explained in the following.
Variable Information
It was tested if the variable Information had an in-
fluence on the decision of the test persons regarding 
ethical decision making. People who received speci-
fic information regarding the dealing with competi-
tors decided ethically better than those who did not 
receive such information. The treatment group was 
informed via a separate document which stated in the 
core principles to be careful when interacting with 
the competition. In the treatment group a middle rank 
with a value of 73,71 was reached, indicating that 
they would not engage in illegal activities with com-
petitors contrary to 56,87 in the control group. The 
proposed activities included a weekend-trip skiing 
paid for by the competition to get to know each other 
and get a common understanding of the market and 
the customers. The agreeing to accept an invitation 
could be explained by missing knowledge or delibe-
rate acting against the core principles in the control 
group. Concerning actively engaging in illegal acti-
vities such as adapting the prices it can be concluded 
that a middle rank with an average value of 66,85 
in the treatment group was reached indicating that 
they would choose rather not to engage in an acti-
vity compared to 62,55 of the control group. It can 
be concluded that there is a common understanding 
that agreements on prices are illegal. The difference 
of 4,34 between both groups could be explained by 
a CEO statement which was given to the treatment 
group. In the statement it was demanded to gain 
market share in a fair way from the treatment group. 
The control group had only the information go gain 
market share. No special CEO statement was given.
Considering the engagement of a dubious export 
agent the treatment group decided slightly better than 
the control group. A middle rank with an average 
value of 65,35 of the treatment group shows rather 
non engagement in business transactions compared 
to a middle rank of 63,79 in the control group. In 
the scenario of the invitation of top customers, the 
test persons were asked whether they would spend 
parts of the budget which is left over to invite exter-
nals for roughly 5.000 € per person. As also public 
customers were invited this business conduct can 
be clearly marked as illegal behavior. The scenario 
was conceptually designed to put pressure on the 
participant as in the situation the superior who was 
a strong influence on the individual supported the 
idea of an invitation. Overall the tendency to invite 
these customers was rather high. With an average 
middle rank of 65,41 the willingness to invite these 
external guests is slightly higher ranked in the tre-
atment group. In the control group an average value 
of 63,74 and a rank sum of 4462,0 indicate almost 
certain invitations. The last scenario requested a de-
cision of whether to accept obvious lying or not. The 
treatment group was provided with the values of the 
company which include as one value honesty. The 
average value of 69,00 of the treatment group indi-
cates a strong rejection of lying, but also the control 
group strongly objects lying with a middle rank with 
an average value of 59,80. Therefore the conclusi-
on is that a common sensitization has taken place 
already.
Variable Control
For the variable Control one test person in the tre-
atment group and another person in the control 
group did not answer all questions. Therefore the 
answers are concluded from 57 to 58 test persons in 
the treatment group and from 69 to 70 persons in the 
control group. It was tested if the variable Control 
had an influence on the decision of the test persons 
regarding ethical decision making. In the scenario 
“Making a donation” the treatment group was in-
formed that spending activities are checked by the 
internal audit function to evaluate sponsoring activi-
ties and donations. Therefore unethical if not illegal 
spending activities are scrutinized by an audit. With 
this information an middle rank of 73,89 was rea-
ched concerning the question if the donation which 
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a friend requested would be accepted. On the other 
hand an middle rank of only 55,69 was reached of 
the control group. Hence it follows that donations 
would rather be made than rejected on average in the 
control group which is not in scope of an audit which 
is executed by the audit department. In the treatment 
group the knowledge about an audit function which 
might check spending behavior leads to a higher re-
jection rate. In another scenario the two groups were 
confronted with an apparently legitimate payment 
request by an external partner. The treatment group 
knew that a specific control disapproved the pay-
ment to the external partner. With this information a 
strong rejection of the payment request was reached 
with a middle rank of 81,65. Compared to that the 
control group with no indication of disapproval was 
on average less sure about a rejection. A middle rank 
of 48,51 indicates a position with an inclination to 
rejection in evaluating whether a payment should be 
made or not. The announcement of a future audit to 
control the activities and scheduling of a concrete 
date for the treatment group had little influence on 
the decision behavior. The groups were asked about 
simplifying documentation in the sense of stopping 
the documentation of several decisions therefore 
decreasing transparency in their area of work. In the 
context of the increased controlling activity by the 
audit function, the treatment group shows a slightly 
higher tendency to keep the existing documentation 
with a middle rank of 67,34 while the control group 
remains slightly below in that scenario with a value 
of 62,14. The scenario which asked for a payment 
to a supplier differentiated between an existing con-
trol for the treatment group by the execution of the 
so called 4 eye principle and the non-existence of a 
control. The so called 4 eye principle is based on a 
segregation of duties concerning the persons respon-
sible for the handling of transactions. It means that 
the person who transfers the money or makes the 
payment can not be the same person who oversees 
and judges if the payment is allowed. This separati-
on of roles guarantees that only approved payments 
are executed. With a middle rank of 73,85 the tre-
atment group shows a higher value than the control 
group with a middle rank 55,72. Both groups rather 
disapprove the payment, also a tendency towards in-
difference can be concluded.
Variable Instruction
For the variable Instruction one test person in the 
treatment group and another person in the control 
group did not answer all questions for all items. 
Therefore the answers are concluded from 57 to 58 
test persons in the treatment group and from 69 to 
70 persons in the control group. For the scenario to 
employ a business consultant, the mere existence of 
an instruction has an impact. In the treatment group 
a middle rank of 66,18 indicates that the business 
consultant will rather not be employed. The control 
group which was unaware of the instructions gained 
a middle rank of about 61,28. This average is still 
rather rejecting, but slightly below the treatment 
group. The decision to borrow a company asset for 
private reasons was rejected by both the treatment 
and the control group. The existence of an instruc-
tion led to a middle rank of 72,03 in the treatment 
group which would reject, the non-existence of an 
instruction in the control group led to a middle rank 
56,46. In a scenario concerning new cooperations 
and partnerships in South America a Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M&A) situation was depicted. A few 
proposals need an evaluation. In the treatment group 
an instruction helped the test persons to estimate the 
risk level. While in the control group a middle rank 
of 43,04 indicates a high probability to engage in 
the deal in the treatment group the existence of an 
instruction led to the discernment of unforeseen risk 
which resulted in a rather negative response. With a 
middle rank of 90,36 concerning a rejection of the 
M&A deal, a participation is unlikely. In a situation 
of interaction with authorities at the airport, the thre-
at of contractual fines (up to 2 Mio. U$) made both 
the treatment and control group accept the payment 
of a facilitation fee which can be illegal. While in the 
control group an average of rejecting the request of 
such a payment with a middle rank of 57,03 is low, 
it is interestingly that the treatment group rejects 
the payment with a middle rank of 73,52. Even the 
written hint “The company instructions forbid such 
kinds of payments.” does not have a bigger influ-
ence. It is therefore concluded that business needs 
combined with contractual threats do override com-
pany given instructions.
Variable Sanction
For the variable Sanction one test person in the tre-
atment group did not answer all questions for all 
items. Therefore the answers are concluded from 57 
to 58 test persons in the treatment group and 70 per-
sons in the control group. The first item testing of the 
variable Sanction asks the participants about their 
estimations in regards to employee behavior accor-
ding to the internal rules. In the treatment group it is 
pointed out that behavior which is not in accordance 
with the company rules will at least be sanctioned 
with an informal warning. In the treatment group the 
majority of participants guesses that employees will 
not breach the rules if sanctions are known to them. 
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For the treatment group a middle rank of 67,06 is 
reached. The control group shows a middle rank of 
62,38 for the statement that employees will not bre-
ach the rules. It can therefore be concluded that the 
deterring effect of sanctions is limited regarding to 
the obedience to formal rules. Classical misconduct 
as theft of company assets is neither tolerated by 
the control group nor the treatment group. A speci-
fic treatment for that item was not chosen as it can 
be characterized as common knowledge. The only 
influence from the core principles given out as addi-
tional information in the first round is the statement 
“…we honor the law”. In the treatment group a mi-
ddle rank of 62,07 was reached indicating that the 
dismissal of the employee as a sanction would be 
the right action. For the control group a middle rank 
of 66,51 was reached indicating the same conclusion 
even slightly above the value of the treatment group. 
The situation of the notification that an employee is 
giving business to a friend breaching company rules 
yielded surprising results. The treatment group in-
dicates with a middle rank of 65,39 that the emplo-
yee should rather not be kept in the workforce. The 
control group comes to the same conclusion, with a 
middle rank of 62,86. It appears that although the 
treatment group has been given a clear statement on 
giving advantages to individuals (“No decision must 
be made on personal interest but only for the best 
of the company.”) there has been no effect on the 
treatment group. The control group which did not 
receive any information on the topic at all scored 
almost identical. The situation of passive bribery of 
a purchase manager who accepted a gift was seen by 
the treatment group negatively with a middle rank of 
69,42, whereas the control group was headed in the 
same direction with a middle rank of 60,42. It must 
be noted that a direct treatment was only given for 
the first item. The other items were modified by ge-
neral information which informed about sanctions, 
but they were not linked to specific scenarios. It is 
concluded that sanctions which are directly linked 
to actions do have a deterring effect, but the activi-
ties per se are rather weak instruments to stir ethical 
right behavior.
Variable Reporting
For the variable Reporting one test person in the 
treatment group and another person in the control 
group did not answer all questions for all items. The-
refore the answers are concluded from 57 to 58 test 
persons in the treatment group and from 69 to 70 
persons in the control group.
The report on company rules violation is mentio-
ned for the treatment group. Although the treatment 
group is informed about the existence of such a re-
porting it does not have an impact on their acting 
which would lead to ethically better acting. The 
treatment group has a middle rank of 55,69 rejecti-
ng circumventing internal rules. That means that 
a big population does consider breaking the rules 
knowing that it will be reported about them. On the 
contrary, the test persons who did not read the report 
(the control group) have an ethically better acting 
with a middle rank of 70,14 rejecting circumventing 
internal rules. Apparently a reporting about ethical 
wrong behavior in general does not lead to a change 
in decision making. Furthermore, it is concluded 
that the fact that the reporting states a constant num-
ber of persons breaking the rules, the test persons 
can use the reporting for the justification of their 
acting. The fact that personal reporting requirements 
are created does lead to a little difference in acting. 
Together with the announcement that the reporting 
will be shown to the head of the department, a mid-
dle rank of 72,16 in the treatment group is reached 
concerning rejecting the question if customers are 
invited for the 3rd time in a month. It can be conclu-
ded from the answer pattern that the majority would 
still invite customers even if a reporting requirement 
is given. In the control group were such requirement 
is not given the middle rank of 57,14 considering re-
jection indicates that there is no concern of miscon-
duct for this group. In the scenario theft of company 
assets, reporting requirements do have a positive 
impact on problem consciousness. In the treatment 
group which does have a monthly reporting a middle 
rank of 65,85 is reached rejecting the question that 
theft can not be controlled. In the control group this 
opinion is also gained, but to a lesser degree with 
a middle rank of 61,56. The situation of a business 
lunch which costs the test persons are asked to co-
ver led to wide acceptance. In the treatment group 
a middle rank of 66.99 was reached indicating that 
with certainty or almost certainty the costs for the 
lunch would be covered by the test persons. The fact 
that the treatment group was informed that the costs 
had to be reported to their superior did apparently 
only have a minor impact. The control group scored 
similarly with a middle rank of 62,44 indicating that 
in the control group the costs would even be borne 
more readily. It is therefore concluded that the vari-
able did not have a high influence.
3.2.  Inter group analysis
Both in research and reality a tendency exists to ei-
ther make the allegation that compliance is helpful 
for modern business conduct or to reject compli-
ance in total. In reality, the opinion that in several 
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countries or industries corruption is necessary and 
therefore compliance activities are in vain is also ar-
ticulated. The country argument also encompasses 
the question whether specific cultures are more pro-
ne to corruption than others. While analyzing data 
from the laboratory experiment it was compared 
how the Latvian population stood in comparison to 
the German population. An ethnological research 
could enhance the research in this regard as a cross 
border managing approach is perceived to be more 
complex than the managing of conduct with a ho-
mogeneous culture (Martin, Altizer, Barrera, 2014, 
p. 14). For theoretical purposes it is task of research 
to find out if certain activities do have an impact or 
not. Possible criticism could be that the conception 
about compliance activities might be perceived as 
trivial and logic. On the other hand critics allege 
that all compliance measures are in vain. Therefore 
the question which is the most promising activity is 
worth to be discussed. A CMS does not guarantee 
from failure in challenging environments, but it is 
worth to look at areas for improvement as in such 
a way the risk can be reduced. The empirical part 
shows that the conception is not as trivial as it might 
be perceived by critics and that only in certain cases 
significant differences were made.
From the 5 independent variables not all could be 
attributed a high influence to stir ethical better be-
havior. In a further analysis the similarities between 
the German and Latvian population were resear-
ched. In the context of the variable Information for 
the Latvian population the provision of information 
material in general does not have an effect for chan-
ged decision making. For the German population 
general information material does have in one item 
an effect, namely the acceptance of an invitation by 
a competitor. The provision of general information 
material overall is limited for the German populati-
on, too. For the variable Control the analysis revea-
led for two out of four items the Latvian population 
shows a significant difference between the treatment 
and the control group. These two items are the “Pa-
yment to blacklisted external partner” with an asym-
ptotic significance of 0,002 and the item “Payment 
to a supplier” with an asymptotic significance of 
0,001. The German population showed also a signi-
ficant difference between the control group and the 
treatment group for two out of four items. One of the 
items is the “Payment to blacklisted external part-
ner” for which an asymptotic significance of 0,000 is 
reached. For the other item “Making a donation” an 
asymptotic significance of 0,014 is reached. Appa-
rently both groups disapprove the payment of blac-
klisted external partners which is positive and shows 
that the groups are sensitized. For further activities 
which had the announcement of checking of sponso-
ring and donation activities has a stronger influence 
on the German than the Latvian population. On the 
other hand the Latvian population would not make 
a payment to a supplier which hasn’t been double 
checked with another person. In the total population 
3 items showed a significant difference. Concerning 
the variable Instruction for two out of four items the 
Latvian population shows a significant difference 
between the treatment and the control group. These 
two items are the “Videobeamer” with an asympto-
tic significance of 0,033 and the item “Mergers & 
Acquisitions” with an asymptotic significance of 
0,000. The German population showed also a signi-
ficant difference between the control group and the 
treatment group for two out of four items. One of the 
items is the “Mergers & Acquisitions” for which an 
asymptotic significance of 0,000 is reached. For the 
other item “Facilitation payment” an asymptotic sig-
nificance of 0,024 is reached. In the total population 
3 items showed a significant difference. An 100% 
identical answer is reached concerning the engage-
ment of an M&A transaction. It can be concluded that 
there is total agreement between both groups. Clear 
instructions about borrowing of company assets are 
consciously refused by one part of the population. A 
reason might be that the probands judge themselves 
superior to written instructions. On the other hand 
facilitation payments are more likely to be not to be 
made by the German population when treatment is 
given. For the variables Sanction and Reporting no 
discrepancies were shown. As there is no differen-
ce regarding the variable Sanction between the two 
groups it can be concluded that general sanctions or 
mentioning of activities does not have an influence 
on the groups. Only specific activities might have an 
influence. For the variable Reporting neither the La-
tvian nor the German population does show strong 
differences between treatment and control group. In 
fact the overall significance levels are the weakest 
with a value of 0,034 for “Reading News” and 0,017 
for “Documentations of invitations”.
Overall, the hypothesis H0 could be rejected for 
4 of 5 variables, as a significant difference between 
the treatment group and the control group was cal-
culated in specific items. For one variable the signi-
ficance level does not allow for rejection of the hy-
pothesis H0. From the item analysis it can be shown 
that not all items led to this conclusion. A few of the 
items apparently do not have a significant influen-
ce. It appears that given information must be very 
precise and concrete otherwise it does not have the 
desired effect. General information is not helpful. 
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Sanction mechanisms obviously play a minor role in 
improving ethical behavior. The reporting schemes 
or requirements do also not have a major impact on 
the sensitization of ethical acting. Practical conclusi-
ons are that CMS do have a positive influence ge-
nerally. The highest influence can be attributed to 
activities which are based on Information, Controls, 
Instructions and Reporting. However these activities 
must be designed specifically to individual needs.
4. Discussion/Conclusions
From the 5 individual variables not all could be attri-
buted a high influence to stir ethical better behavior.
For that reason as general advice it can be stated 
these activities could be preferred in a holistic app-
roach. The approach should be embedded in an ove-
rall risk analysis to make sure that the relevant com-
pliance risks are covered. Furthermore the aspect 
of control should be evaluated. If control is meant 
to be decreased in the future and also work places 
become more virtual, organizations have to rely on 
employees with a sound ethical understanding who 
propel the business. This change must be lived by 
the managing function: “If practitioners prefer to 
remain as managers who “do things right”, aim for 
stability and control, and thereby enact compliance 
roles, they are unlikely to change their organizati-
onal culture. However, when practitioners think of 
themselves as leaders who “do the right thing”, then 
it is possible for them to engender change in their re-
spective organizations.” (Sison, 2010, p. 333). Con-
trol activities must therefore be tailored to the spe-
cific risk in order to decrease corruptive tendencies.
Confounding variables could be created by a per-
son during the experiment who interferes with the 
decision process. In an office environment using a 
field experiment approach this is likely to happen, 
but in a laboratory test this situation was avoided 
and did not happen. Another factor might be the 
influence which is given by copying answers from 
another test person. This influence is deemed little 
as the test persons are told that they are not compe-
ting for the right answer. Furthermore the test per-
sons are under observation by the experimenter. The 
attitude of students might be a confounding varia-
ble as they might judge the experiment as artificial. 
This is a limitation which is inherent to laboratory 
experiments. Furthermore another limitation might 
be the age as confounding variable as the students 
do not have the same level of maturity, experience 
and personal history as managers. These possible in-
fluences are accepted as the general reduction from 
the complex problem corruption to a model is deci-
ded on purpose to advance research knowing that 
only a small step is possible within the context of 
this work.
Additionally it must be noted that the task to esta-
blish an organizational framework which allows for 
compliance has to be set by the management (Pies, 
2008, p. 45) as they present the organizational le-
aders (Thoms, 2008, p. 421). They are foremost cha-
llenged to implement a culture which combines high 
ethical standards with high business performance.
In the long run, the pressure on employees will 
rather augment than diminish. Partly the reason for 
this is a striving for profit maximization, sometimes 
enforced by the shareholder-value-concept. A pure 
focus on profit and satisfaction of monetary requi-
rements imposed by shareholders will turn out to be 
risky in the long term.
If management wants to improve their ethical 
standing than it must take the time to think about 
its position: “Without adequate direction and well 
thought-out plans based on existing research fin-
dings, it is difficult for those responsible to manage 
and enhance the ethical behaviour of employees.” 
(McDonald, G. M., Zepp, R. A. (2007), p. 55). The 
deployment of a CMS might lead to new alterna-
tives which were not even thought about before. It 
is not the focus of a CMS to forbid all activities, 
but to govern the compliance program for the orga-
nization in order to ensure behavior in accordance 
with the law and to promote ethical business. For 
this reason activities must carefully be selected for 
a tailored approach. CMS are scalable. The choice 
of the scope and the scale of a CMS depends on a 
variety of factors. A holistic CMS also has the task 
to find out what motivates employees to act illega-
lly or non-compliant. It must analyze the company, 
its reward schemes and check whether it is appro-
priate to incentive the employees to act in a legal 
framework and in the moral standards which are set. 
Furthermore it is also necessary to look at company 
values to align the CMS with them: “Values are the 
key to understanding how to shape employee rule-
-oriented behavior and are particularly important in 
motivating employees to voluntarily adopt compa-
ny values as their own.” (Tyler, Dienhart, Thomas, 
2008, p. 34) The challenge of a holistic compliance 
management lies in its reduction to address nece-
ssary operational and strategic requirements from 
the business. A scope which is too narrow can be 
limiting, a scope which is too wide leads to a waste 
of resources. It can not be expected that a CMS co-
vers all possible risks an organization encounters. In 
order to address future risks CMS need innovative 
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developments (Wieland, 2010). Working on com-
pliance management in this way, it can become a 
competitive advantage. Companies understanding 
compliance management holistically chooses CMS 
elements carefully. The sudden end of corruptive be-
havior is an illusion. But due to media coverage and 
information access via the internet it is likely that 
more cases in the future than nowadays will become 
transparent. The reason is an increase in awareness 
and increased transparency. As reflection of soci-
ety businesses with all business functions should 
acknowledge this development and incorporate a 
holistic compliance management in their activities 
to proactively prevent cases of corporate misdeed.
References
Armantier, O., Boly, A. (2008). Can corruption be studied 
in the lab? Comparing a field and a lab experiment. 
Scientific Series, pp. 1–29. Retrieved from: http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1324120.
Basran, S. (2012). Employee Views of Ethics at Work: 
2012 Continental Europe Survey. Institute of Business 
Ethics, pp. 1–42. Retrieved from: http://www.ibe.org.uk/
userfiles/euethicsatwork2012.pdf.
Fadzil, F. H., Haron, H., Jantan, M. (2005). Internal 
auditing practices and internal control system. Managerial 
Auditing Journal, 20(8), pp. 844–866.
Friedman, M. (1970). The Social Responsibility of 
Business is to Increase its Profits. The New York Times 
Magazine, September 13. Retrieved from: http://www.
colorado.edu/studentgroups/libertarians/issues/friedman-
soc-resp-business.html.
Hamel, G. (2012). What matters now: How to win in a 
world of relentless change, ferocious competition and 
unstoppable innovation. San-Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Jacquemet, N. (2005). Corruption as Betrayal: 
Experimental Evidence on Corruption Under Delegation. 
GATE Groupe d’Analyse et de Théorie Économique 
Working Papers, 05–06, pp. 1–29. Retrievd from: http://
ideas.repec.org/p/gat/wpaper/0506.html.
Martin, A., Altizer, L., Barrera, V. G. (2014). Understanding 
Compliance Risk Across Emerging Markets. Journal of 
Business Compliance, 1(14), pp. 12–22.
McDonald, G. M., Zepp, R. A. (2007). Business Ethics: 
Practical Proposals. Journal of Management Development, 
8(1), pp. 55–66.
Palazzo, G, Krings, F., Hoffrage, U. (2012). Ethical 
blindness, Journal of Business Ethics, 109, pp. 323–328.
Pies, I. (2008). Markt und Organisation. Programmatische 
Überlegungen zur Wirtschafts- und Unternehmensethik. 
In: W. Kersting (Ed.), Moral und Kapital Grundfragen der 
Wirtschafts- und Unternehmensethik, Paderborn, Mentis, 
pp. 27–58.
Price Waterhouse Coopers (2013). Public procurement, 
costs we pay for corruption. Utrecht, DC: Author.
Sison, M. (2010). Recasting public relations roles: 
agents of compliance, control or conscience. Journal of 
Communication Management, 14(4), pp. 319–336.
Thoms, J. C. (2008). Ethical Integrity in Leadership and 
Organizational Moral Culture. Leadership, 4(4), pp. 419–442.
Tyler, T., Dienhart, J., Thomas, T. (2008). The Ethical 
Commitment to Compliance: Building Value-Based 
Cultures. California Management Review, 50(2), pp. 31–51.
Wieland, J. (2010). Compliance Management als 
Corporate Governance – konzeptionelle Grundlagen 
und Erfolgsfaktoren. In: J. Wieland, R. Steinmeyer, S. 
Grüninger (Eds.), Handbuch Compliance Management, 
Berlin: Erich-Schmidt Verlag, pp. 15–38.
Doručeno redakci: 14. 9. 2014
Recenzováno: 1. 12. 2014
Schváleno k publikování: 25. 2. 2015
Malcolm Gammisch, PhD-student
University of Latvia
Faculty of Economics and Management
Aspazijas bulv. 5, Latvia
Tel.:+4915222972136
E-mail: mgammisch@web.de
Prof. Dr. Signe Balina
University of Latvia
Faculty of Economics and Management
Aspazijas bulv. 5, Latvia
Tel.:+37167034716
E-mail: signe.balina@lu.lv
